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Abstract
Recommender systems provide an impressive way to overcome information overload problem. However, they are vulnerable to
proﬁle injection or shilling attacks. Malicious users and/or parties might construct fake proﬁles and inject them into user-item
databases to increase or decrease the popularity of some target products. Hence, they may have an eﬀective impact on produced
predictions. To eliminate such malicious impact, detecting shilling proﬁles becomes imperative. In this work, we propose a
novel shilling attack detection method for particularly speciﬁc attacks based on bisecting k-means clustering approach, which
provides that attack proﬁles are gathered in a leaf node of a binary decision tree. After evaluating our method, we perform
experiments using a benchmark data set to analyze it with respect to success of attack detection. Our empirical outcomes show
that the method is extremely successful on detecting speciﬁc attack proﬁles like bandwagon, segment, and average attack.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Customers want to buy the most liked items through online vendors. However, there are too many choices.
Collaborative ﬁltering (CF), one of the recommendation techniques, helps users select appropriate products. It is
used to deal with information overload problem by producing highly accurate predictions. The major assumption
of CF techniques is that users having similar experiences on past items are tend to agree on new items ? . CF
systems utilize a very sparse n × m user-item matrix, which includes n users’ preferences about m products. The
systems produce recommendations to their users by evaluating other like-minded users’ preferences.
CF methods are successful at providing accurate referrals about products ? . They are also able to overcome
information overload problem by matching users with right items for them. However, they are vulnerable to
proﬁle injection or shilling attacks ? . There might be malicious users and/or companies that aim to manipulate the
recommender systems’ outcomes on behalf of their advantages. Somemalicious entities might want to increase the
popularity of particular target items. Similarly, others might want to decrease the popularity of some other target
products. To manipulate the popularity of target items, bogus proﬁles are created and injected into the system’s
database. If such malicious proﬁles are not detected by the system, they are then able to aﬀect the accuracy of
the predictions depending on robustness of the recommendation algorithm. The quality of predictions depends
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on data quality. In other words, producing accurate predictions is possible with high quality data. Bogus proﬁles
make data quality worse and that leads to inaccurate recommendations. Therefore, detecting shilling proﬁles is
imperative for the success of CF systems.
The attackers construct fake proﬁles by using information about CF systems. Two parameters used to design
the attacks in general are called ﬁller size and attack size. Filler size is related to the number of ﬁlled cells with
fake ratings. Attack size is about the number of bogus proﬁles injected into the system. The values of such
parameters aﬀect the success of shilling attacks. After designing the attack proﬁles, the attackers insert them into
the system’s database as though they are authentic users. Hence, they manage to manipulate the popularity of a
target item in favor of themselves. Shilling attacks can be categorized as push or nuke attacks according to their
intend. Push attacks are designed to increase the popularity of a target item while nuke attacks are tend to decrease
the popularity of a target item. It is almost impossible to prevent shilling attacks at all. In other words, it is more
likely to have bogus proﬁles because it is very diﬃcult to verify the identity of each customer over the Internet.
As a rule of thumb, if you do not prevent an attack at all, you should detect them. Thus, detecting attack proﬁles
is one of the eﬀective ways of defending against such attacks ? .
There are a number of shilling attack detection methods like statistical techniques, classiﬁcation-based methods,
unsupervised clustering-based schemes, variable selection, and other techniques ? . While statistical methods focus
on anomalies and try to detect outliers caused by suspicious rating proﬁles, classiﬁcation-based techniques aim to
detect malicious users based on generic attributes derived from each proﬁle, which reveals hidden deviations from
general trend of collected data. Clustering is used as an incremental method to detect malicious proﬁles in which
the database is clustered periodically to detect signiﬁcant changes in cluster centers and avoid proﬁles causing
such alterations ? . Since shilling proﬁles also resemble high similarity to genuine users, unsupervised clustering
techniques are applied with several classiﬁcation attributes to improve detection skills ? .
We propose a novel approach to detect bogus proﬁles. In our method, a binary decision tree (BDT) is
constructed by recursively clustering the training data to locate the fake attack proﬁles via bisecting k-means
clustering algorithm. Utilizing the fact that shilling attack proﬁles are generated according to a certain strategy,
which yields very similar proﬁles, we propose to recursively cluster user-itemmatrix and distinguish attack proﬁles
by huddling them at some level. While forming a BDT via bisecting k-means clustering algorithm, we divide the
matrix into two clusters at each level and calculate an intra-cluster correlation coeﬃcient for each internal node.
We hypothesize that internal nodes holding attack proﬁles demonstrate high intra-cluster correlation due to their
high similarity among themselves. We continuously repeat such process until there remains at most a predeﬁned
number of users in any leaf node. Then, we traverse BDT to detect anomalies with intra-cluster correlation
coeﬃcients to detect and label the node holding all or most of the attack proﬁles.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We brieﬂy describe previous related research in Section 2. A
brief information about shilling attacks is presented in Section 3. In the next section, we describe our approach in
detail. The experiments conducted to analyze the success of the approach and the empirical results are discussed
in Section 5. Finally, we provide our conclusions and future research directions in Section 6.
2. Related Work
For the overall success of recommender systems, detecting shilling proﬁles is imperative. Hence, there are
various studies focus on detecting bogus proﬁles. Many researchers propose diﬀerent techniques such as statistical
methods, classiﬁcation-based techniques, unsupervised clustering-based schemes, variable selection, and other
techniques ? . The authors in ? propose statistical anomaly detection technique, which is based on item average
values, to detect anomalies in user-item matrices. Those items that do not comply with the general behavior of the
data are determined using statistical process control techniques. In another study ? , Neyman-Pearson statistical
detection theory-based shilling attack detection method is proposed. Another method proposed to detect bogus
proﬁles is based on probabilistic Bayesian network models ? . Statistical process control-based attack detection
method is proposed by ? . The method utilizes the user deviations from the average of rating numbers to create
control chart, which is then used to detect fake proﬁles according to the warning rules of the chart.
Generic attributes-based classiﬁcation techniques are also widely used to detect malicious users ? . Deviation
frommean agreement, degree of similarity, weighted deviation frommean agreement, weighted degree of agreement,
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and length variance are examples of such generic attributes. Bogus proﬁles are detected based on generic attributes
derived from each individual proﬁle. In addition to generic attributes, attack model speciﬁc attributes are utilized
to detect fake proﬁles ? . To employ generic or model speciﬁc attributes as part of classiﬁcation, diﬀerent
classiﬁcation algorithms like kNN, C4.5, and SVM classiﬁers are utilized ? ? . Cao et al. ? propose an algorithm
depends on semi-supervised learning to detect bogus proﬁles. They use naı¨ve Bayes as initial detection method
for labeled users and use EM-λ to strengthen eﬀect of the method on unlabeled users.
Clustering can be used to ﬁlter out malicious users or fake proﬁles ? . The main idea behind clustering
is to cluster the user-item matrix periodically and check whether cluster centers are changing signiﬁcantly or
not. Signiﬁcant changes are most probably caused by shilling proﬁles. PLSA-based clustering is employed to
group users for determining those users whose data can be used for prediction generation ? . The authors in ?
utilize a clustering algorithm based on statistical characteristics of data set to detect attack proﬁles by applying
k-means clustering on produced proﬁles. Two clustering-based algorithms, CLUTR (clustering by using trust)
and WCLUTR (clustering with weighed similarities derived from trust), are proposed to percolate suspect bogus
proﬁles and to improve the robustness of CF algorithms ? . Chakraborty and Karforma ? propose three strategies to
detect bogus proﬁles. Their approaches depend on outlier analysis. Their ﬁrst strategy is based on PAM clustering,
which is used to determine whether a new user is fake or not. The method detects bogus proﬁles with large number
of ﬁller items with high success. However, it is not very successful for ﬁnding outliers with small number of ﬁller
items. Additionally, they generate an approach to detect bogus proﬁles in large clusters. Also, they propose an
angle-based outlier detection algorithm to detect bogus proﬁles in the database. Although clustering is eﬀectively
used to detect fake proﬁles, it might not be easy to diﬀerentiate bogus proﬁles from real proﬁles because malicious
and genuine users might be very similar to each other. To overcome this challenge, PCA-based variable selection
method is proposed to determine malicious users by computing covariance between users ? . Examples of other
methods proposed to detect attack proﬁles are time interval-based method ? and data lineage method ? .
As presented above, there are diﬀerent studies in the literature focusing on detecting attack proﬁles due to
its importance. In addition to developing attack strategies and designing diﬀerent attacks, it is also vital to form
detection schemes. Besides other methods, clustering is widely used for determining malicious users or proﬁles.
Since clustering can be eﬀectively utilized as a detection scheme, we propose a novel clustering-based approach,
which is very eﬀective to detect attack proﬁles having a speciﬁc aim. To the best of our knowledge, this study is
the ﬁrst one that employs bisecting clustering method for attack proﬁle detection. Also, our study is an explicit
approach, which means that there is no need for preliminary information about attacks to detect them.
3. Shilling Attacks
Shilling attack proﬁles should be designed in such a way so that they serve their intended aims. They are
constructed according to diﬀerent attack models using the knowledge of the CF system, its rating database, its
products, and/or its users ? . Push attacks aim to increase the popularity of a target item so that the recommender
system returns it as the recommended item to its users. Conversely, nuke attacks try to decrease the popularity of
a target item to make it less likely suggested. A general shilling attack model is shown in Fig. 1 ? . It consists of
four sets of items. IS , set of selected items, determines the characteristics of the attack. They are determined using
a rating function δ. IF is selected randomly with a rating function σ to obstruct detection of an attack. A unique
item it is targeted with a rating function, γ, to form a bias on. Remaining items are left unrated indicated as Iφ.
Although there are various attack models, we focus on speciﬁc shilling attacks. They can be brieﬂy described
as follows ? . Segment attack is designed for a group of users who tend to be interested in the target object. The
attacker wants her products to be recommended to related users. If an attacker whose products are related with
horror movies, she wants to recommend her products to a group of users who like horror movies. The attacker
rates the products the segment users will like as maximum rating value. She rates the other items as minimum
rating value. She rates the target item as maximum rating value. In bandwagon attack, popular items are chosen
as selected items and rated as maximum rating value in the ratings’ interval so that attack proﬁles like other users
much more. Filler items are chosen randomly and rated around the system’s mean. The target item’s rating is
determined as maximum rating value. The set of ﬁller items is chosen randomly and rated around the each item’s
mean in average attack. The target item’s rating is determined as maximum or minimum value of the interval of
system ratings for push and nuke attacks, respectively.
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Fig. 1. General form an attack proﬁle
4. Detecting Shilling Proﬁles via Bisecting k-means Clustering
Recommender systems aim to provide useful guidance for users about their online activities by providing
personalized predictions. Such recommendations lead them to shop particular products, read tailored news, see
speciﬁc movies, or listen to certain kinds of songs. Although these systems provide such referrals based on
sensitive user preferences, they usually are not able to check authenticity of users in online platforms. Since
they are open for public usage, it is straightforward for an attacker to leak into a recommender system database.
Thus, they are subjected to manipulations of malicious users/parties that aim to mislead recommendations for
authentic users in favor of particular target items. Such manipulations cause misguidance of users towards
irrelevant products, which in turn results with time losses for unsatisﬁed customers and ﬁnancial losses for online
vendors. Hence, detecting and removing shilling attempts is vital for CF systems to provide a pleasing service to
their customers. In this section, we ﬁrst describe how to apply bisecting k-means clustering to form a BDT before
detection and introduce utilization of intra-cluster correlation as a detection attribute. Then, we explain a novel
detection scheme for speciﬁc attacks on traversing produced BDT and explain utility of the proposed algorithm in
detection process.
4.1. Building a BDT with intra-cluster correlation attribute
Bisecting k-means clustering-based CF system is proposed by ? to improve accuracy and scalability. In
such scheme, the central server produces a BDT oﬀ-line by applying bisecting k-means clustering algorithm
on collected user-item matrix prior to prediction estimation. Given the user-item matrix and an optimal number of
neighbors (N) for the recommendation process as a stopping criterion, k-means clustering is applied to group users
into two distinct clusters at each level recursively. Cluster centers are indexed at all internal nodes of BDT to be
used as a forwarding tool for newcomers and such process is repeated until at most N users remain in leaf nodes.
Finally, a tree is obtained with indexed cluster centers at internal nodes and clustered users at leaf nodes. Such
tree is utilized as a binary decision tool at each level in order to forward a new user to their neighbors according
to the similarity levels to cluster centers. The tree grows by the same methodology as if population of any leaf
node exceeds the stopping criterion, then corresponding node is bisected, which provides an easily scalable and
maintainable structure for the scheme.
In addition to indexed cluster centers at internal nodes, we propose to include a detection attribute, intra-cluster
correlation, to each internal node, which deﬁnes how close are the clustered users to the cluster center, as explained
through a pseudo-code layout in Algorithm 1. Bisecting k-means clustering procedure divides a given user-item
matrix, Un×m, into two sub-clusters for each internal node recursively. According to Algorithm 1, intra-cluster
correlation for each sub-cluster, C1×m, is calculated as the average of Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcient values
between each member of the sub-cluster and the cluster center. In other words, we measure average of similarities
of each member of the internal cluster to the corresponding cluster center to quantify how tight an internal node
is. Degree of intra-cluster correlation and changes of such attribute over levels is used as a detection parameter in
the proposed detection scheme. Indeed, since shilling proﬁles are generated with a certain strategy, it is expected
that such proﬁles do not scatter much around the cluster center and resemble high intra-cluster correlation.
In order to form a BDT to be utilized in detection process with intra-cluster correlation values for internal
nodes, the data holder follows the procedure described in Algorithm 2 ? . Given Un×m and an optimal number of
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Algorithm 1 Intra-cluster correlation calculation for a given sub-cluster
Require: Cluster center (C1×m) & Cluster members (Mk×m)
1: function ICC(C,M)  intra-cluster correlation calculation
2: Initialize: similarities1×k ← 0  correlation level for each member
3: μC ← mean(C)  cluster center’s mean
4: σC ← std(C)  cluster center’s standard deviation
Calculate similarities between each member and cluster center:
5: for all ui in M (i← 1 to k) do
6: similarities(i) = pcc(M(i),C, μC , σC)  Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcient calculation
7: end for
Return average of similarities:
8: return mean(similarities)
9: end function
neighbors or N for a CF system, resultant BDT is estimated via bisecting k-means clustering by dividing Un×m
into two distinct clusters at each level. Cluster centers and intra-cluster correlation values are indexed to be used
as a forwarding tool and detection parameter for each corresponding level, respectively. If the number of rating
proﬁles in any sub-cluster exceeds the stopping criterion, N, then bisecting procedures is repeated to divide those
clusters using the same approach. Such procedure continues repeatedly until obtaining a BDT having indexed










































Fig. 2. An example binary decision tree
An example BDT produced via the proposed bisecting k-means clustering-based detection scheme can be seen
from Fig. 2. The user-item matrix holds 1,200 users initially and stopping criterion N is determined to be 250 in
this example for the sake of clarity. Members of root node are denoted with M1.1, where integer part indicates
current height of BDT, which is one for the case of root, and fractional part represents index of sub-clusters at
such level. Then, 1,200 users of root node are divided into two groups with 409 and 791 users at the ﬁrst level
indicated as M2.1 and M2.2, respectively. Corresponding intra-cluster correlation values are calculated and indexed
for left and right sub-clusters, indicated as ICCL and ICCR, respectively. In addition, cluster centers are indexed at
the root of the tree as CL and CR, where superscripts denote of which sub-tree the cluster center belongs to, either
left or right. Similarly, in the left sub-tree of root, 409 users are clustered into two groups of 152 and 257 users,
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denoted as M3.1 as a leaf node and M3.2 as a branch node, respectively. Corresponding intra-cluster correlation
values and cluster centers are indexed at M3.1 branch node. Going on so forth, each branch node is divided into
two sub-clusters unless they contain N or fewer users. Finally, the BDT is completed with intra-cluster correlation
values and two cluster centers at each branch nodes to facilitate detection of possible malicious attack attempts.
Algorithm 2 BDT formation via bisecting k-means clustering
Require: User-item matrix (Un×m) & Stopping criterion (N)
1: function BKM(U,N)  bisecting k-means cluster
2: Initialize: IDX(n)← 0 & BDT.centers2×m ← null
3: BDT.le f t ← null  pointer to left sub-tree
4: BDT.le f t.ICC ← null  intra-cluster correlation for left sub-tree
5: BDT.right ← null  pointer to right sub-tree
6: BDT.right.ICC ← null  intra-cluster correlation for right sub-tree
7: BDT.LST : a new BDT, BDT.RST : a new BDT  left and right sub-trees
8: Cluster: [IDX, BDT.centers] = k-means(U, 2)
9: for all ui in F (i← 1 to n) do
10: if IDX(ui) = ”left” then
11: append ui into BDT.le f t
12: else
13: append ui into BDT.right
14: end if
15: end for
16: BDT.le f t.ICC ← icc(BDT.centers(le f t))
17: BDT.right.ICC ← icc(BDT.centers(right))
18: if size(BDT.le f t) > N then
19: BDT.LST = bkm(BDT.le f t,N)
20: end if
21: if size(BDT.right) > N then




4.2. Traversing BDT for detecting shilling proﬁles
Shilling attack proﬁles are usually created by a bot and follow a certain strategy according to the attack type in
order to manipulate produced predictions, as described in Section 3. Since recommender systems operate based on
quantiﬁed correlations among rating proﬁles over co-rated items, such strategy causes attack proﬁles to resemble
more similarity to each other than genuine proﬁles. For example, while ﬁller items of all average attack proﬁles are
rated with such items’ mean votes, bandwagon and segment attacks focus on speciﬁcally selected popular items
according to the general community tastes or a set of particular users’ favorites. Such parallel voting strategy
increases similarity among attack proﬁles. In addition to the strategy of voting selected and/or ﬁller items in
attack proﬁles, such attacks aim to manipulate a particular product’s prediction by rating it with the maximum
possible vote. Therefore, rating for the target item is both the same and marginal in all attack proﬁles, which
further intensiﬁes correlation among malicious proﬁles.
Relying on the fact that shilling proﬁles demonstrate high similarity among themselves, we can infer that
the correlation-based clustering algorithms are heuristically more prone to group shilling proﬁles together. Such
discrimination can be observed sharper when number of clusters is reduced. Hence, we propose a bisecting
clustering approach to detect malicious proﬁles. Although bisecting clustering approach is able to ﬁlter out shilling
proﬁles from genuine ones over levels of clustering, a detection mechanism is needed to locate where such proﬁles
reside in a BDT. For this purpose, we introduce intra-cluster correlation values of nodes in Section 4.1. In this
171 Alper Bilge et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  31 ( 2014 )  165 – 174 
section, we explain how we utilize intra-cluster correlation attribute for detecting shilling proﬁles in recommender
system databases.
Algorithm 3 Traverse BDT for detection
Require: Binary decision tree (BDT ) & Upper and lower limit speciﬁer (ρ)
1: function Detect(BDT, ρ)  determine predominant cluster holding all or most of shilling proﬁles
Start forwarding from root node:
2: if BDT.le f tElements.ICC > BDT.rightElements.ICC then
3: parentTree = BDT.le f tElements
4: BDT = BDT.le f t
5: else
6: parentTree = BDT.rightElements
7: BDT = BDT.right
8: end if
Continue traversing according to changes in ICC:
9: while (BDT.le f tElements.ICC AND BDT.rightElements.ICC
is not in range [parentTree.ICC ∓ parentTree.ICC × ρ%]) do
10: if BDT.le f tElements.ICC > BDT.rightElements.ICC then
11: parentTreeElements = BDT.le f tElements
12: if BDT has a left child then




17: parentTreeElements = BDT.rightElements
18: if BDT has a right child then







After producing the BDT as described in Section 4.1, our proposed detection scheme follows a traversal
procedure to determine a node (branch or leaf) that is most likely to hold all or most of inserted fake proﬁles. A
detailed procedure of the proposed scheme is outlined as a pseudo code layout in Algorithm 3. The algorithm
relies on two key points to continue. The ﬁrst key point describes how to ﬂow along the BDT to keep track
of gathered attack proﬁles and the second one deﬁnes where to stop traversing and label current node as the
target node holding shilling proﬁles. The algorithm starts traversing from root node and descends one level at
a time until a stopping condition occurs; and ﬁnally returns the node where it breaks to be treated as holder of
shilling proﬁles. Initialization procedure selects either left or right child of the root node according to intra-cluster
correlation values, where the higher the correlation, the more likely for the node to hold attack proﬁles. Thus,
the goal of the ﬁrst key point while traversing the BDT is to be directed towards higher intra-cluster correlation
values because huddled attack proﬁles heuristically increase correlation in clusters. Then the algorithm continues
in a while loop, choosing one of the left or right children at each time and checking for the stopping condition
to be occurred. The main anchor point of the stopping condition is that while the intra-cluster correlation values
of shilled clusters are higher than the ones with genuine proﬁles, when the shilled clusters consisting totally or
mainly of attack proﬁles are divided into two clusters, intra-cluster correlation of two children nodes cannot have
diversely diﬀerent intra-cluster correlation than their parent node. Such phenomenon is the signal to stop traversing
and label parent node as the target node of attack proﬁles. For this purpose, Algorithm 3 checks if intra-cluster
correlation of both children is lower or upper than a factor of parent node’s intra-cluster correlation. If not, the
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algorithm continues traversing by selecting the child node with higher intra-cluster correlation. However, if both
children’s intra-cluster correlation lie in the boundaries of change factor, then it can be concluded that the parent
node holds attack proﬁles. When it is clustered, the attack proﬁles distribute to left and right children in such a
way so that intra-cluster correlation of children do not change signiﬁcantly and reside in change factor boundaries
for both children. Note that the range of such change is determined by ρ parameter in Algorithm 3 and its optimal
value can be determined experimentally.
The proposed detection scheme by traversal of a BDT with intra-cluster correlation values is expected to be
more eﬀective with attacks having strong and speciﬁc characteristics rather than random production of attack
proﬁles. Therefore, we claim that the proposed scheme is more powerful at detecting shilling strategies like
bandwagon, segment, and average attacks rather than random attack. Another interesting point about the detection
procedure is that if the recommender system is shilling-free, or in other words, no shilling proﬁles are inserted
into the system; it is very unlikely for the detection scheme to return false positive results, i.e., detecting a mass
of genuine proﬁles as malicious. That is because if the system is shilling-free, then genuine proﬁles deﬁnitely
demonstrate a diversity among themselves so that no two children of a parent node could have intra-cluster
correlation values within a narrow range. Such intuitive phenomenon should be veriﬁed by experimental procedures.
5. Experiments
We conducted various experiments using a benchmark data set to probe how our method performs. After
producing the BDT via bisecting k-means clustering, we evaluated the eﬀectiveness of the proposed scheme. We
used publicly available data set MovieLens Data (MLP). It contains 100,000 ratings in a 5-star rating scale for
1,682 movies. The ratings are collected from 943 users. Each user has rated at least 20 movies. We chose
precision and recall as evaluation metrics. Let A be the number of attack proﬁles that classiﬁed correctly as
fake, B be the number of authentic proﬁles that misclassiﬁed, and C be the number of attack proﬁles that is not
correctly identiﬁed. Then, Precision (P) = A / (A+B) and Recall (R) = A / (A+C). We also utilized F-Measure as
a combination of precision and recall as follows: F1 = 2PR/(P + R).
We ﬁrst performed experiments to show how varying values of ρ aﬀect overall performance of the proposed
scheme. We set ﬁller size to 25 while we varied attack size from 5 to 25. We also changed the values of ρ from 1
to 10. For each attack size, we conducted our experiments 100 times while varying ρ values. We ﬁnally computed
the overall averages of precision and recall values for all attack size values and displayed them in Table 1.
Table 1. Eﬀects of varying ρ values on overall performance
Precision Recall
ρ 1 2 4 7 10 1 2 4 7 10
Segment 0.955 0.933 0.875 0.850 0.863 0.950 0.955 0.965 0.952 0.967
Bandwagon 0.574 0.577 0.521 0.469 0.396 0.371 0.572 0.815 0.942 0.988
Average 0.746 0.743 0.749 0.751 0.701 0.622 0.619 0.623 0.628 0.638
In Table 1, we showed how our scheme performs with varying ρ values. In terms of precision, ρ values of 1,
2, and 7 provide the best outcomes for segment, bandwagon, and average attacks, respectively. Similarly, in terms
of recall, ρ values of 10, 10, and 10 provide the best outcomes for segment, bandwagon, and average attacks,
respectively. In order to ﬁnd out the joint eﬀects of such measures, we also computed F1-measure values for each
attack. The values of 1, 4, and 7 output the best results with respect to F1-measure for segment, bandwagon, and
average attacks, respectively. Thus, we selected them as optimum values and utilized them in the following trials.
After determining the optimum values of ρ for each attack, we performed experiments to show how varying
ﬁller size values aﬀect the detection ability of our proposed method. In these trials, we set attack size to 25. We
conducted our experiments while varying ﬁller size from 3 to 25. After running our trials 100 times, we computed
the overall averages of precision and recall. We ﬁnally displayed our outcomes in Table 2.
The outcomes in Table 2 show that our method is very successful for detecting speciﬁc attacks like segment,
bandwagon, and average attacks. For average attack, detection ability of our method increases with augmenting
ﬁller size values. On the other hand, performance of our scheme slightly becomes worse with increasing ﬁller
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Table 2. Eﬀects of varying f illersize values on overall performance
Precision Recall
Fillersize 3 5 10 15 25 3 5 10 15 25
Segment 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.984
Bandwagon 0.904 0.897 0.929 0.984 0.985 0.922 0.914 0.945 1.000 0.999
Average 0.521 0.916 0.992 0.990 0.988 0.498 0.800 0.826 0.877 0.949
size values for segment attack. For bandwagon attack, the best outcomes are observed when ﬁller size is 15. The
proposed method, in general, provides promising outcomes with respect to both precision and recall for almost all
ﬁller size values. To give an overall picture about the detection ability of our method, we calculated F1-measure
values for each attack. Filler size values of 15, 15, and 25 provide the best outcomes for segment, bandwagon,
and average attacks, respectively. Note that we ﬁxed attack size at 25 and varied ﬁller size values in these trials.
Although our method performs well for larger ﬁller and attack size values, it still provides promising results for
smaller ﬁller and attack size values especially for segment and bandwagon attacks.
We ﬁnally conducted experiments to demonstrate how our method performs with varying attack size values.
We set ﬁller size at 25 in these trials and varied attack size values from 3 to 25. Notice that we utilized the optimum
ρ values. We again performed our experiments 100 times. After calculating overall averages, we displayed the
ﬁnal values of precision and recall in Table 3.
Table 3. Eﬀects of varying attacksize values on overall performance
Precision Recall
Fillersize 3 5 10 15 25 3 5 10 15 25
Segment 0.622 0.980 0.854 1.000 1.000 0.620 0.984 0.853 1.000 0.982
Bandwagon 0.053 0.085 0.070 0.947 0.985 0.970 0.973 0.352 0.987 0.999
Average 0.161 0.898 0.964 0.982 0.988 0.127 0.765 0.873 0.916 0.951
As seen from Table 3, overall performance of our scheme usually becomes better with increasing attack size
values. In terms of precision, our method performs the best for detecting segment attack. It is also able to detect
average and bandwagon attacks with very high success rates. The method is very successful for detecting all three
attacks with respect to recall. Although our method seems for smaller attack size values especially for bandwagon
attack, it is very successful for larger attack size values for all attacks. Also note that in order to aﬀect the overall
performance of any CF system, larger attack and ﬁller size values should be utilized. In order to provide an overall
picture, we again computed F1-measure values. The best results are observed for attack size values of 15, 25, and
25 for segment, bandwagon, and average attacks, respectively. In the literature, PLSA-based clustering is used as
a detection scheme ? . According to empirical results in ? , when ﬁller size is 25, precision and recall values are
about 0.80 for PLSA-based scheme for detecting average attack. Our method performs better than their scheme
in terms of average attack. Our method is also very successful at detecting other attacks. When attack size is 15
and ﬁller size is 25, F1-measure is 1.000 and 0.967 for segment and bandwagon attacks, respectively.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
Collaborative ﬁltering schemes should provide accurate predictions eﬃciently. Since they might be subjected
to shilling attacks, they also should utilize proﬁle injection attack detection methods. Otherwise, they will not be
able to provide accurate and dependable predictions. Clustering is a powerful tool used for diﬀerent purposes.
Due to its ability, there are diﬀerent shilling attack detection proposals based on clustering. In this work, we
also utilized the idea of clustering to ﬁlter out malicious proﬁles in a recommender system database. To the best
of our knowledge, our work is the ﬁrst one that uses the idea of bisecting k-means clustering as a shilling attack
detection method. The clustering scheme recursively groups users into two sub-groups until the stopping criterion.
Due to their high resemblance, it is most likely to have all or most of the attack proﬁles in one cluster. Our real
data-based empirical outcomes show that our method is very successful at detecting bogus proﬁles generated from
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speciﬁc attack models like segment, bandwagon, and even average attacks. There are three main factors (detection
parameter, ﬁller size, and attack size) that might aﬀect the performance of our method. Therefore, we conducted
various experiments to evaluate their eﬀects on performance. With increasing ﬁller and attack size, detection
ability of our proposed method usually enhances. In general, our method provides promising results for almost
all ﬁller and attack size values. In addition to segment, bandwagon, and average attacks, there are other proﬁle
injection attacks like random, reverse bandwagon, love/hate attacks and so on. We will investigate whether our
proposed method is able to successfully detect such attacks or not. Also, we want to further improve the overall
success of our scheme by combining some existing shilling detection methods. And ﬁnally, we will utilize our
method in some privacy-preserving environments.
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